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	do anything against it except of Soviets for action.	vo oor brobasa w	ua. Thev m	ust depend on .	the		
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2.	The Chinese telieve that their	manad A.					
	The Chinese telieve that their war, on the Korean pattern, in						
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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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- 5. The Chinese at the urging of Moscow are making preparations for war and will continue to do so whether or not they foresee a third world war. If war does not seem imminent they may relax to a certain extent; since they are already on a war footing, they can only hasten or retard measures.
- 6. The long and short term aims of the Chinese are now indistinguishable: they include jetting Soviet aid, convincing the Soviet satellites that only China is second to the USSR as a leader of the international Communist bloc, and continuing a warlike policy toward the west. In this last instance, it is to be noted that the Chinese are only arms of the Soviets, they are only assisting the Soviets in driving wedges between the British and Americans, or the British and India, or the French and Bac Dai. The Chinese strongly desire to build up an independent foreign policy, but are unable to do so.
- 7. The extent of Soviet control over Chinese policy cannot be estimated but it can be expected to increase from day to day. The "control is handmaiden of aid" and the Chinese Communists are dependent on the Soviets for aid while the Soviets on the other hand cannot afford to alienate the Chinese.
- 8. There is general unity among Chinese Communist leaders and whatever minor differences exist are no stumbling block in policy matters. No serious differences or splits among Chinese (ommunist leaders can be expected until a serious conflict of interest arises. Some potential conflicts exist, such as subservience to Soviet policy versus xenophobia, and dictatorship of the urban proletariat versus a predominably agricultural society. The agricultural population is gradually becoming dissatisfied and this could eventually lead to a conflict of interest.

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